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A NEW HORIZON: LEGAL 
REFORMS, NEW REGULATORY 
MODELS, PREDICTIONS 
 
 
The Importance of Deceptive 
Practice Enforcement in Financial 
Institution Regulation 
 
Prentiss Cox* 
 
No more bytes need be consumed nor ink spilled to observe 
that the rampant abuse and negligence in residential mortgage 
lending over the last ten years was a disaster for America and 
beyond.  Because this concept has attained near universal 
recognition, there has been a struggle to define exactly what 
happened and who was responsible.  How we collectively write 
this story affects how government will respond to the long-­term 
problems in the market exposed by the mortgage collapse. 
Subprime mortgage lending was a disaster for hundreds of 
thousands of American homeowners long before it was at the 
center of the popular understanding of the financial crisis.  The 
history of harm to American homeowners, and the utter failure 
of the American regulatory system to grasp and rectify these 
problems until it was too late to contain the damage to the 
financial system, offers valuable lessons for how we should 
structure the reform of our financial institutions. 
The thesis of this Article is that enforcement of consumer 
protection laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices should be part of the core mission of the re-­structured 
financial regulatory system.  Soaring defaults in mortgage 
loans and accompanying devastation to the credit markets 
could have been averted if the persistent concerns raised by 
consumer advocates working with subprime borrowers in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s had been given serious and prompt 
1
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attention.1  Not only the consumer financial services industry, 
 
* Prentiss Cox is an Associate Professor of Clinical Law at the 
University of Minnesota Law School.  Until July 2005, he was an Assistant 
Attorney General and Manager of the Consumer Enforcement Division in the 
0LQQHVRWD$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO·V2IILFH7KLV$UWLFOHZDVSRVVLEOHRQO\EHFDXVH
of the research assistance provided by Kari Rudd.  The author thanks Claire 
Hill and Brett McDonnell for their generous and helpful advice. 
1. See, e.g., Promoting Home Ownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the 
Subprime Mortgage Market: Joint Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and the H. Subcomm. on 
Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 
108th Cong. 19 (2004) (statement of Michael D. Calhoun, General Counsel, 
Center for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter Calhoun 2004 testimony] 
VWDWLQJ WKDW ´>W@KH FRQWLQXDWLRQ RI XQFKHFNHG SUHGDWRU\ ORDQ SUDFWLFHV
JUDYHO\ WKUHDWHQV KRPHRZQHUVKLS DQG HTXLW\ RI IDPLOLHVµ HQFRXUDJLQJ WKH
FRPPLWWHH´WRHQDFWHIIHFWLYHIHGHUDOSURWHFWLRQVOLNHWKRVHLQ1RUWK&DUROLQDµ
LQFOXGLQJDVVLJQHHOLDELOLW\DQGQRWLQJWKDW´IHGHUDOSURWHFWLRQVVKRXOGEHD
IORRU QRW D FHLOLQJµ Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and its 
Customers: Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit and the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the 
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of Eric 
Stein, Senior Vice President, Center for Responsible Lending of North 
Carolina) [hereinafter Stein 2004 testimony] (discussing the impact of North 
&DUROLQD·VDQWL-­SUHGDWRU\OHQGLQJODZQRWLQJWKDW´OLPLWLQJXSIURQWIHHV 
has eliminated a lot of the equity stripping abuses . . . [and] borrowers[ ] who 
qualify for conventional loans[ ] are actually getting conventional loaQVµ
Predatory Lending Practices: Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial 
Servs., 106th Cong. 107 (2000) (statement of Margot Saunders, Managing 
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) [hereinafter Saunders 2000 
testimony] (discussing the limitations of the Home Ownership Equity 
3URWHFWLRQ$FWZKLFK´RQO\FRYHUVSHUFHQWRIWKHVXESULPHORDQV>DQG@
GRHVQ·W DGHTXDWHO\ DGGUHVV >SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ@ E\ SURKLELWLQJ UHDO SUREOHP
WHUPVµ Id. (written statement of John E. Taylor, President and CEO, 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition) [hereinafter Taylor 2000 
ZULWWHQ WHVWLPRQ\@ GLVFXVVLQJ 1&5& DQG WKH 5DLQERZ386+ &RDOLWLRQ·V
LQLWLDWLYH WR ´FRPEDW :DOO 6WUHHW ILQDQFLQJ RI SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJµ DQG
encouraging the Federal Reserve Board to use its authority to regulate 
mortgage lenders that are the subsidiaries of bank holding companies as well 
DV´PDQ\FRPSDQLHVWKDWXQGHUZULWHSXUFKDVHDQGVHUYLFHPRUWJDJH-­backed 
securities based on subprime loans by non-­EDQNOHQGHUVµReform of the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Truth in Lending Act (TILA): 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit and 
the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. 
on Banking and Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 138 (1998) (statement of 
Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) 
>KHUHLQDIWHU6DXQGHUVWHVWLPRQ\@´>$@EXVLYHORDQSURWHFWLRQVDUHYHU\
very necessary, and it would be inappropriate to proceed with amending the 
only two Federal laws that essentially govern mortgages in this country 
without dealing with the abusive loans that we see every day in every State 
LQ WKH FRXQWU\µ Id. (written statement of Margot Saunders, Managing 
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) [hereinafter Saunders 1998 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21
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but also many regulators, legislators and academics viewed 
consumer protection as either irrelevant to core regulatory 
objectives or antithetical to market efficiency and growth.2  
They were wrong.  Government agencies and public interest 
entities primarily focused on consumer protection were 
sounding the alarm about the practices that caused the 
mortgage collapse for almost a decade before financial system 
regulators began to take the problem seriously.3  Consumer 
protection concerns should be at the core of the regulatory 
system mission, partly to ensure that lending institutions are 
financially sound in the long-­term. 
Part I of this Article examines the federal and state 
regulatory system for mortgage lending and identifies 
regulators responsible for enforcing consumer protection laws 
applicable to mortgage origination.  Part II reviews how those 
regulators performed in the years leading up to the mortgage 
crisis, including the state consumer protection actions that 
highlighted, at an early stage, the fundamental problems with 
mortgage lending. Part III suggests some ideas for how to build 
a consumer protection focus within the financial institution 
 
written testimony] (discussing the failure of the marketplace to protect 
consumers, making recommendations for improving disclosure requirements, 
proposing substantive protections for borrowers, and opposing moratoria on 
class action lawsuits regarding illegal lender-­paid mortgage broker fees). 
2. See, e.g., Oren Bar-­Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86-­  GHVFULELQJ EDQNLQJ DJHQFLHV· GLVLQWHUest in 
exercising their powers to develop consumer protection regulations and the 
2IILFH RI WKH &RPSWUROOHU RI WKH &XUUHQF\·V HIIRUWV WR DVVHUW IHGHUDO
preemption of state consumer protection laws).  See generally Richard A. 
Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 803 (2008). 
3. See, e.g., Saunders 2000 testimony, supra note 1;; Taylor 2000 written 
testimony, supra note 1;; Saunders 1998 testimony, supra note 1;; Saunders 
1998 written testimony, supra note 1.  See also Robert Berner & Brian Grow, 
They Warned Us, BUS. WK., Oct. 20, 2008 (discussing the efforts of Iowa, 
North Carolina, Georgia, Michigan, and the City of Cleveland to regulate 
predatory lending during the early 2000s and federal preemption of state 
regulatory authority);; Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Federal Trade 
Commission, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (Mar. 9 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v010004.shtm (commenting on proposed amendments 
to Regulation Z implementing the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
$FW ´+2(3$µ UHFRPPHQGLQJ H[SDQVLRQ RI +2(3$ DQG QRWLQJ ´WKH OLQN
between subprime lending and foreclosure rates, the latter of which have 
increased more thaQWKHPDUNHWVKDUHRIVXESULPHORDQVµ 
3
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regulatory structure. 
 
I. Consumer Protection and Mortgage Lending Regulation 
 
Two related questions often raised in discussing the 
mortgage meltdown are: (1) why did so many American 
homeowners obtain mortgage loans that ended in default, or 
perhaps even were destined to fail;; and (2) why did creditors 
and investors who ultimately provided the capital for these 
loans fail to properly assess their risk?  The first question 
raises issues of loan origination.  In terms of regulation, it begs 
a follow-­up inquiry about how residential mortgage lenders 
were able to sell such loans in the first place.  The second 
question implicates a somewhat distinct set of actors, especially 
in the secondary financing markets.4  This Article focuses on 
the first question³issues of loan origination and the consumer 
protection laws applicable to those transactions.  The Article 
discusses whether a stronger focus on consumer protection 
enforcement actions in public regulation of the residential 
mortgage market may have prevented the mass origination of 
subprime mortgage loans that defaulted at historic levels.5 
While there clearly is a relationship between the secondary 
market actors and consumer protection concerns in loan 
origination,6 consumer protection laws naturally focus on loan 
 
4. See, e.g., Chris L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2255-­63 (2007) (describing inadequacy of current 
consumer protection laws in providing recourse against lending abuses with 
securitized financing). 
5. 7KLV $UWLFOH IRFXVHV RQ ´VXESULPH OHQGLQJµ DOWKRXJK LQ WKH SHULRG
from 2004 through 2006 many of the same issues arose in the origination of 
´$OW-­$µ ORDQV ZKLFK FRQVLVWV RI ORDQV RI OHVV WKDQ SULPH TXDOLW\ RU WKDW
contain higher risk features, such as negative amortization.  U.S. GOV·T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING 
AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 24 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
6. This relationship between consumer protection in origination and 
secondary market financing has been analyzed with commendable brilliance 
by Professors Chris Peterson, Pat McCoy, and Kathleen Engel.  These 
commentators advocated imposing assignee liability for problems in 
origination on secondary market actors to make them account for consumer 
protection concerns when funding mortgage loans.  See Kathleen C. Engel & 
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21
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origination³the part of the lending process in which the 
homeowner is involved directly.  Consumer protection laws 
applicable to mortgage financing apply almost entirely to loan 
origination.7 
 
A. Consumer Protection and Mortgage Lending 
 
Consumer protection laws governing mortgage loan 
origination can be grouped into three categories: (1) disclosure 
requirements;; (2) substantive regulation of loan terms;; and (3) 
a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts.  Restrictions 
on mortgage lending in each of these areas exist at both the 
federal and state level.  These laws also are a mix of generally 
applicable laws and those that govern only mortgage lending. 
 
1. Disclosure Requirements 
 
The primary federal laws governing consumer finance 
lending mostly rely on mandated disclosure of information to 
the consumer about the transaction.8  The Truth in Lending 
$FW ´7,/$µ KDV GHWDLOHG GLVFORVXUH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU ´FORVHG
HQGµFUHGLWWUDQVDFWLRQVZKLFKZRXOGLQFOXGHWKHYDst majority 
of first-­lien mortgage loans.9  The lender must provide a 
standardized disclosure form that reveals the cost of credit in 
WKHIRUPRIDQ´DQQXDOSHUFHQWDJHUDWHµ10  Four other amounts, 
 
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007);; Peterson, supra note 4.  See also 
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1337-­57 (2002) 
(calling for a suitability standard for subprime loans). 
7. 7KH7UXWK LQ/HQGLQJ$FW ´7,/$µ LPSRVHVREOLJDWLRQVRQDFUHGLWRU
at the time a loan is originated through disclosure requirements.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1602(f), 1637a, 1638 (2006).  HOEPA prohibits certain terms for high-­cost 
loans.  Id.    7KH 5HDO (VWDWH 6HWWOHPHQW 3URFHGXUHV $FW ´5(63$µ
also regulates loans at the origination stage through disclosure requirements 
and a prohibition on unearned fees and kickbacks.  12 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2604, 
2607.  RESPA additionally regulates loan servicing and escrow account 
administration.  Id. § 2605. 
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the 
Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in 
Lending, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 187 (2008) ´Today, the consumer credit 
PDUNHWSODFHLVJRYHUQHGDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\E\GLVFORVXUHUXOHVµ. 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1638. 
10. Id. § 1638(a)(4);; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17, 226.18(e) (2009). 
5
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VXFK DV ´WKH WRWDO RI SD\PHQWVµ PXVW EH SURPLQHQWO\
disclosed.11  Numerous other items, such as whether the loan 
contains a prepayment penalty, can be disclosed less 
prominently on the same form.12 
Also encompassed within TILA is a separate set of 
disclosures for high cost mortgage refinancing loans enacted 
with thH+RPH2ZQHUVKLS(TXLW\3URWHFWLRQ$FW´+2(3$µ13  
HOEPA applies only to mortgage loans that exceed certain cost 
RU DQQXDO SHUFHQWDJH UDWH ´WULJJHUµ DPRXQWV14  Until recent 
amendments, these amounts were set by regulation at a very 
high level that excluded even the usual subprime mortgage 
loan.15  HOEPA requires a special notice that warns the 
KRPHRZQHU WKDW ´[y]ou could lose your home, and any money 
you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under 
WKHORDQµ16  These disclosures must be given to the homeowner 
three business days prior to the closing on the refinance loan.17 
Mortgage loan disclosures also are required by federal law 
XQGHUWKH5HDO(VWDWH6HWWOHPHQW3URFHGXUHV$FW´5(63$µ18  
$´JRRGIDLWKGLVFORVXUHµOLVWLQJWKHFRVWVWKDWZLOO be incurred 
 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a);; 12 C.F.R. § 226.18. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1);; 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a). 
13. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-­325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2191-­94 (1994) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639).  See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31, 226.32. 
14. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a). 
15. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,527 (July 30, 2008) (to 
EH FRGLILHG DW  &)5 SW  ´&RQVXPHU DGYRFDWHV DQG VRPH VWDWH
officials stated that HOEPA is generally effective in preventing abusive 
terms in loans subject to the HOEPA price triggers.  They noted, however, 
that very few loans are made with rates or fees at or above the HOEPA 
WULJJHUVµId. at 44,536 ([T]he Board has concluded that [a threshold of 
1.5 percentage points above the average prime offer rate for first lien loans 
and 3.5 percentage points for second lien loans] should cover the subprime 
PDUNHW DQG JHQHUDOO\ H[FOXGH WKH SULPHPDUNHW    µ See also Stephen 
Labaton, Lenders Fight Stricter Rules on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 
2008, at A1 (noting that the HOEPA trigger of 8% above the prevailing rates 
on Treasury securities only applied to 1% of all mortgages). 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(1)(B). 
17. Id. §§ 1639(a)(1)(B), (b)(1);; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.31(c)(1), 226.32(c)(1).  
With the important exception of the right to rescind a mortgage refinancing 
loan, the remedies for violation of TILA disclosure requirements are 
somewhat limited in practice.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640-­1641.  As this Article 
focuses on public enforcement issues, the private right of action for violation 
of consumer protection laws is not relevant to our inquiry. 
18. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2604. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21
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by the consumer in originating the mortgage must be given to 
the consumer within three days of the application for the 
mortgage loan.19  RESPA and various state law requirements 
impose other disclosure obligations on mortgage lenders that 
add more weight (literally) to the unmanageable and 
unreadable collection of documents that constitute a typical 
residential mortgage loan closing.20 
 
2. Restrictions on the Terms of Mortgage Loans 
 
Less prominent in the mortgage lending regulatory scheme 
are substantive restrictions on the costs and terms of 
residential mortgage loans.21  No federal law substantially 
restricts the terms of most residential mortgage lending.  The 
primary exception to this light regulatory touch on mortgage 
loan terms are certain requirements that apply to the limited 
set of mortgage loans regulated under HOEPA.22  HOEPA is 
the only federal law that restricts the substantive terms of 
residential mortgage loans in the United States regardless of 
the state in which the loan is originated or the licensing status 
of the lender.  HOEPA loans cannot contain negative 
amortization terms or most prepayment penalties.23 
 
19. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2604(c)-­G5(63$DOVRSURKLELWV´NLFNEDFNVµEHWZHHQ
and among lenders and mortgage settlement service providers, such as 
appraisers or title insurers.  12 U.S.C. § 2607.  These provisions are 
substantially eviscerated, however, by allowing affiliates to escape this 
restriction through the provision of a disclosure at closing.  12 U.S.C. § 
2607(c).  Public enforcement of the limited kickback prohibition remaining 
after the exclusion of affiliates is notoriously weak.  See U.S. GOV·T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF THE 
TITLE INDUSTRY AND BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07401.pdf. 
20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2603-­2604.  The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency called for simplifying and streamlining consumer disclosures in 
VWDWLQJWKDW´FRQVXPHUVWRGD\UHFHLYHGLVFORVXUHVVRYROXPLQRXVDQGVR
technical that many simply do not read them ² or when they do, do not 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHPµ Consideration of Regulatory Relief Proposals: Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) 
(statement of Julie Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency). 
21. See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 8. 
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(c)-­(i);; 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d). 
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(c), (f);; 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(d)(2), (d)(6)-­(7).  Reverse 
mortgages, which are typically sold to elderly homeowners, also are subject to 
substantive loan-­term restrictions, 12 C.F.R. § 226.33, although this type of 
7
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State laws, on the other hand, often provide important 
limits on the costs of mortgage loans.  Several states, such as 
Iowa, prohibit or restrict the imposition of prepayment 
penalties on mortgage loans.24  Various state laws also limit 
the amount of finance charges, late fees, or provide loan terms 
at a rate higher than that for which the borrower qualifies.25  
The type of loan terms regulated and the limits placed on those 
loan terms vary widely under state law. 
 
3. Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practice Regulation 
 
Although not specifically related to mortgage lending or 
even consumer finance transactions, an important part of the 
public regulatory scheme in the development of the subprime 
mortgage lending market is statutory fraud laws, often referred 
to as unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws, or simply 
´8'$3µ ODZV26  UDAP laws have a different character than 
either disclosure requirements or substantive loan term 
restrictions.  Consumer finance disclosures or loan term 
restrictions provide generally objective, if often complex, 
compliance standards.  A public regulator can create a 
checklist for a compliance program relying almost exclusively 
on the documents in the loan file.27  Whether the TILA 
disclosure is in the file and properly completed, or whether the 
loan contains a permissible prepayment penalty, are questions 
that usually will have a clear answer discernible on 
examination of the loan documents. 
 
loan is of little consequence to the story at issue here. 
24. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 535.9 (2006). 
25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § DSURKLELWLQJ´FKXUQLQJµRU
putting a borrower into a loan that does not provide a tangible net benefit);; 
Id. § 58.137 (limiting fees to 5% of loan amount);; GA. CODE ANN. § 7-­6A-­3(3) 
(2003) (limiting the circumstances in which a late fee may be charged);; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 24-­10.1 (1993) (limiting the amount of late fees). 
26. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of 
Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on 
Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 674 (2008). 
27. See, e.g., Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process of Obtaining 
Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement Costs, 73 Fed. Reg. 68,204, 
68,243 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500, app. A) (line-­by-­
line instructions for completing the settlement statements that lenders must 
disclose to borrowers pursuant to RESPA). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21
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On the other hand, determining a violation of UDAP laws 
requires a public enforcement agency to ask questions such as: 
did the homeowner understand the loan terms;; were the 
representations about loan terms in the sale of the loan 
consistent with the actual loan product;; and did the 
homeowner actually receive the benefits of the loan as 
indicated in the loan documents.  Determining a violation of 
UDAP laws likely requires (1) an examination of the loan file;; 
(2) interviews with the homeowners obtaining the loan and the 
employees or agents who arranged the loan;; (3) a review of any 
marketing materials used in connection with the loan;; and (4) 
any other relevant information beyond the bounds of the loan 
file.28  Even loans that the consumer understood may violate 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWDJDLQVW´XQIDLUµSUDFWLFHVLQWKH)HGHUDO7UDGH
&RPPLVVLRQ´)7&µ$FW29 and most state UDAP laws.30 
 
B. Financial Institution Regulatory Structure and UDAP 
Enforcement 
 
The financial regulatory system in the United States is a 
multi-­headed beast, spanning federal and state government.  
The most striking feature of the financial regulatory system is 
its fragmentation.  Reports by the United States Government 
Accountability Office and the Congressional Oversight Panel, 
appointed under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act,31 
examine this system in detail,32 but such analysis is beyond the 
purpose of this Article.  Instead, I will focus here on a few key 
points relevant for understanding what did (or, more 
importantly, did not) happen in the regulation of the subprime 
 
28. Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor 
Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th 
Cong. (2009) (testimony of Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney Gen.) [hereinafter 
Madigan 2009 testimony], available at 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/Testimony_before_Rep_Fra
nk.pdf, at 2-­6. 
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-­51 (2006). 
30. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (2009). 
31. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5233(a) (West 2009 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part). 
32. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 5;; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 
SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM (2009), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-­012909-­report-­regulatoryreform.pdf 
[hereinafter COP REPORT]. 
9
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mortgage market. 
Especially as to mortgage financing, the regulatory system 
divides into three general categories of regulation³depository 
institutions (mostly banks and thrifts), securities, and non-­
banks.  Within each of these categories, multiple federal and 
state regulators operate with different authorities and 
purposes.  Because this Article focuses on the failure of the 
regulatory structure to correct problems in loan origination, I 
will describe only the depository and non-­bank regulatory 
schemes.  The third part of this subsection sketches the reach 
of state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission 
in UDAP enforcement. 
 
1. Depository Institution Regulation 
 
Depository institution regulation occurs at both the state 
and federal levels.33  There are three types of depository 
institutions³banks, thrifts, and credit unions.34  Each of these 
types of institutions has its own regulator at the federal or 
state level.35  National banks are regulated by the Office of the 
&RPSWUROOHU RI WKH &XUUHQF\ ´2&&µ36  Thrifts, or savings 
banks, arose from the ashes of the collapsed savings and loan 
regulatory system in the 1980s and are regulated at the federal 
level by the Office RI 7KULIW 6XSHUYLVLRQ ´276µ37  Federal 
credit unions are regulated by the National Credit Union 
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´1&8$µ38  States also typically have an 
analogous depository institution regulatory structure for each 
of these forms, usually conducted through a regulator called 
WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI )LQDQFLDO ,QVWLWXWLRQV ´'),µ39  The 
 
33. See, e.g., Bar-­Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79-­80. 
34. See, e.g., id. 
35. See, e.g., id. 
36. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, About the OCC, 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited May 29, 2009). 
37. Office of Thrift Supervision, History, 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=History (last visited May 29, 2009). 
38. National Credit Union Administration, About NCUA, 
http://www.ncua.gov/About/Default.aspx (last visited May 29, 2009). 
39. See, e.g., California Department of Financial Institutions, 
http://www.dfi.ca.gov/ (last visited May 31, 2009);; Tennessee Department of 
Financial Institutions, http://www.state.tn.us/tdfi (last visited Sept. 22, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/21
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primary function of each of these regulators is to ensure that 
the depository institutions are run in a safe and sound manner 
so that depositors, and ultimately the federal deposit insurance 
system, are protected from irresponsible business practices.40 
A depository institution draws its operating authority from 
a charter authorized by the specific federal or state law under 
which each regulator operates, and the institution pays 
assessments to that regulator.41  There are two unique aspects 
to this regulatory system.  First, financial institutions 
essentially select their regulator by selecting their type of 
charter.42  Second, the budget for the regulator is drawn 
primarily from charter fees paid by the regulated entities.43  
The largest bank regulator, the OCC, typically derives more 
than 90% of its fee income from charter fees paid by the 
entities that it regulates.44  Regulatory agencies in some other 
fields assess fees, but the depository institution regulatory 
system is unique in that it allows the regulated entity to select 
its own regulator while simultaneously asking the regulator to 
rely on assessments levied on those same regulated entities as 
its primary source of operating funds.45  The predictable result 
RI WKLV DUUDQJHPHQW LV WKDW UHJXODWRUV HQJDJH LQ ´FKDUWHU
FRPSHWLWLRQµ IRU GHSRVLWRU\ LQVWLWXWLRQV46  Financial 
institutions can and do switch from one type of charter to 
another, and thus from one regulator to another, when the 
institution determines that such a switch in charter is in its 
own self-­interest.47 
7KH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH %RDUG ´)5%µ KDV D UROH ZLWK
 
2009);; Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions, http://www.wdfi.org/ 
(last visited May 31, 2009). 
40. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: 
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 73 (2005). 
41. See, e.g., Bar-­Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 79-­80. 
42. See, e.g., id. 
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59. 
44. Amanda Quester & Kathleen Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v. 
Wachovia Bank: Challenges for Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller 
of the Currency, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 187, 200 (2007). 
45. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 159 (2006) (Federal Communications 
Commission fees). 
46. DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-­RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION 
AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA·S MORTGAGE MARKET 177-­78 (2009). 
47. Id. 
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depository institutions, regardless of the primary regulator.48  
The FRB plays a critical role in mortgage lending regulation 
through its authority under TILA and HOEPA to enact 
regulations that apply nationwide to all mortgage loans³rules 
that must be complied with by depository institutions and non-­
bank institutions alike.49  No other regulatory entity possesses 
this type of critical rule-­making authority.  7KH )5%·V
authority under HOEPA is particularly important with 
subprime mortgage lending because it allows the promulgation 
of substantive rules directed at high-­cost lending.50  The FRB 
even has the ability to promulgaWHUXOHVFKDQJLQJWKH´WULJJHUµ
amounts that define which loans are deemed sufficiently high-­
FRVWWREHHOLJLEOHIRULQFOXVLRQXQGHU+2(3$·VSURWHFWLRQV51 
 
 
48. Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American 
Mortgage System: Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit of the H. Financial Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) 
(written statement of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer 
and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) 
[hereinafter Braunstein Testimony], available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/braunstein031109.
SGI DW  ´7KH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH KDV SULPDU\ UXOHZULWLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU
many consumer protection laws, including the Truth in Lending Act and the 
+RPH2ZQHUVKLS DQG(TXLW\ 3URWHFWLRQ$FW     >7@KH%RDUG·V QHZ UXOHV
apply to all mortgage lenders, not just depository institutions supervised by 
WKHIHGHUDOEDQNLQJDQGWKULIWDJHQFLHVµ 
49. See 86&  D ´7KH %RDUG VKDOO SUHVFULEH UHJXODWLRQV WR
FDUU\RXWWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLVVXEFKDSWHUµ id. § 1639(l ´7KH%RDUGE\
regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or practices in connection with (A) 
mortgage loans that the Board finds to be unfair, deceptive, or designed to 
evade the provisions of this section;; and (B) refinancing of mortgage loans 
that the Board finds to be associated with abusive lending practices, or that 
are otherwise not in the interest of the borrower.µ. 
50. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,529 (July 30, 2008) (to be 
FRGLILHGDW&)5SW´&RQJUHVVVHWPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGVIRU+2(3$
loans.  The Board is authorized to strengthen those standards for HOEPA 
loans when the Board finds practices unfaLU GHFHSWLYH RU DEXVLYHµ
Braunstein Testimony, supra note 48, at 152-­54.  In fact, the Federal Reserve 
Board finally implemented a program of supervision for nonbank subsidiaries 
of bank holding companies in September 2009.  Div. of Consumer & Cmty. 
Affairs, Fed. Reserve Sys., Consumer Compliance Supervision Policy for 
Nonbank Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking 
Organizations, Consumer Affairs Letter 09-­8 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/caletters/2009/0908/caltr0908.htm. 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(2) (2006). 
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2. Regulation of Non-­Bank Lenders 
 
A striking feature of the growth in subprime mortgage 
origination was the rise of lending channels outside the 
depository institution, often called non-­bank lenders.52  There 
is very limited federal oversight of most of these non-­bank 
mortgage lenders.  They must comply with the general 
disclosure requirements in TILA and RESPA, as well as other 
limited federal law governing all mortgage-­lending activity, but 
there is no federal regulator supervising these entities.53  
Instead, non-­bank lenders are regulated by state DFIs.54  As 
noted in the U.S. government reports on financial institution 
regulation, non-­bank lenders were not supervised for safety 
and soundness.55 
An important exception to state supervision of non-­bank 
lenders is when these entities are operating subsidiaries of a 
national bank.  The OCC has taken the position that non-­bank 
operating subsidiaries of national banks are subject only to 
regulation by the OCC and that regulation of such entities by 
state DFIs was preempted by the National Bank Act.56  In 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., a divided United States 
6XSUHPH &RXUW XSKHOG WKH 2&&·V H[SDQVLYH YLHZ RI LWV
 
52. See generally Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory 
Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 536-­41 (2005) (discussing the rise of non-­bank 
mortgage lenders making high-­cost subprime loans). 
53. See generally Braunstein Testimony, supra note 48. 
54. Peterson, supra note 40, at 84-­86.  Because these lenders were not 
depository institutions, they were not subject to safety and soundness 
examinations.  A critical recommendation of the recent reports on the 
financial institution regulatory system has been that the public sector should 
ensure that any entity making mortgage loans is examined for safety 
soundness.  As we have discovered in the last few years, failure of these loans 
ultimately resulted in consequence to the public. 
55. U.S. DEP·T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP·T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., 
HUD ² TREASURY REPORT, at 18 (2000).  See also Engel & McCoy, A Tale of 
Three Markets, supra note 6, at 1291-­92. 
56. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 40, at 76-­ GLVFXVVLQJ WKH 2&&·V
actions, including regulations, litigation, and asserting preemption of state 
laws regulating the mortgage of lending activities non-­bank subsidiaries of 
QDWLRQDOEDQNVDQGQRWLQJWKDW´>H@ven the federal government itself found in 
a GAO audit that non-­bank mortgage lending subsidiaries owned by bank 
KROGLQJFRPSDQLHVKDYHUHFHLYHGOLJKWVFUXWLQ\E\IHGHUDOUHJXODWRUVµ 
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preemptive authority in this respect.57 
 
3. UDAP Enforcement 
 
Federal UDAP law is enforced primarily by the FTC.58  
Additionally, UDAP laws, sometimes modeled on the FTC Act 
itself, exist in every state.59  State attorneys general typically 
have the authority to enforce state UDAP laws as well.60  Both 
the FTC and state attorneys general have extraordinarily 
broad scope in the type of conduct under their purview.61  
Telemarketing, automobile sales, credit repair organizations, 
and countless other marketplace transactions are regularly 
subject to UDAP actions by the FTC or the state attorneys 
general.62  Mortgage lending is just one of the many areas in 
 
57. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
58. Bar-­Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 95-­97 (discussing the mission 
and enforcement authority of the FTC). 
59. Budnitz, supra note 26, at 674. 
60. Id. at 676-­77. 
61. 7KH)7&LV´HPSRZHUHGDQGGLUHFWHGWRSUHYHQWXQIDir methods 
of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
SUDFWLFHVLQRUDIIHFWLQJFRPPHUFHµ86&D6WDWHPLQL-­
FTC statutes similarly prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices.  
Budnitz, supra note 26, at 674. 
62. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Commission Actions for April 
2009, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/04/index.shtm (last visited Sept. 22, 2009) 
(listing FTC enforcement actions involving anticompetitive or unfair and 
deceptive practices in the areas of telephone service, breakfast cereal, cable 
and satellite television, herbal remedies, and others);; Press Release, Iowa 
'HSDUWPHQW RI -XVWLFH 2IILFH RI WKH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO ´*HW-­Rich-­4XLFNµ
Scheme Banned from Iowa (May 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest_news/releases/may_2009/World_W
ealth.html (discussing an action against a company using misleading 
DGYHUWLVHPHQWV WR PDUNHW ´PRQH\-­PDNLQJ RSSRUWXQLWLHVµ 3UHVV 5HOHDVH
State of New York, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo 
Obtains Court Order Against Poughkeepsie Chevrolet for Fraudulent Sales 
Practices (Mar. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/mar/mar24a_09.html 
(discussing action against car dealership for fraudulent and deceptive acts in 
connection with the sale of automobiles);; Press Release, State of Minnesota, 
Office of the Attorney General, Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson 
Files Suit Against Source Lending Corporation Over Abusive Predatory 
Mortgage Lending Practices (Aug. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/080814Mortgage.asp 
GLVFXVVLQJ DFWLRQ DJDLQVW D PRUWJDJH EURNHU IRU XVLQJ ´EDLW-­and-­VZLWFKµ
tactics). 
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which these agencies operate. 
Both the FTC and state attorneys general have restrictions 
on their enforcement authority.  The Federal Trade 
Commission is restricted from taking actions against banks.63  
The OCC claims UDAP authority over the conduct of national 
banks.64  State UDAP laws contain a variety of restrictions on 
public enforcement, but these limits vary widely among the 
states.  A few states do not allow their attorneys general to 
bring actions against lenders.65  Some other states prevent 
attorney general actions if the target of the action is an entity 
regulated by another state or federal agency.66 
 
II. How the Various Regulators Performed 
 
The question at issue here is how these various public 
regulators employed their resources and authority to identify 
and regulate the abuses in subprime lending before the 
mortgage crisis became apparent.  The answer, in short, is that 
the only public agencies that systematically attempted to 
attack problems in subprime mortgage lending were a few state 
attorneys general allied with a few state financial regulators 
who brought actions alleging UDAP violations. 
 
A. State Consumer Protection Actions Identified Lending 
Weaknesses 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, a small group of state 
attorneys general, joined by a few state financial regulators, 
began to identify consumer protection problems with subprime 
mortgage lending and brought collective actions, known as 
multi-­state enforcement actions, against these lenders.67  
 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006). 
64. Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and 
Purchased Loans, OCC Advisory Letter 2003-­3, at 5, available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-­3.pdf. 
65. Peterson, supra note 40, at 50. 
66. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (2009). 
67. Prior to joining the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law 
School in 2005, the author was an Assistant Attorney General in the 
0LQQHVRWD $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH DQG ZDV SHUVRQDOO\ LQYROYHG LQ the 
leadership of all of the enforcement actions described herein. 
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Several state attorneys general and regulators initiated actions 
DJDLQVW )LUVW $OOLDQFH 0RUWJDJH &RPSDQ\ ´)$0&2µ
beginning in 1998.68 
FAMCO was making extraordinarily high cost loans to 
borrowers, with fees regularly exceeding 20% of the principal 
amount in a large number of cases.69  The vast majority of 
ERUURZHUV ZHUH VROG ´WHDVHU UDWHµ DGMXVWDEOH UDWH PRUWJDJHV
that would increase at an average of more than 2%, even if 
rates remained stable.70  Most borrowers had no idea about 
these high costs and adjustable interest rates.71 
The deceptive practices engaged in by FAMCO were 
orchestrated through an intensive and highly structured sales 
DSSURDFK FHQWHUHG RQD VDOHV VFULSW WKH FRPSDQ\ FDOOHG ´7KH
7UDFNµ72  The Track sales presentation involved building trust 
between the loan officer and the homeowner and then 
confusing the homeowner about the extraordinary loan terms.73  
Loan officers, who were typically former automobile 
VDOHVSHRSOHZHUHVHQWWR)$0&2·V&DOLIRUQLDKHDGTXDUWHUVWR
train for a month in delivering the sales talk.74  FAMCO filed 
 
68. Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime 
Mortgage Market: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on Housing and 
Community Opportunity, 108th Cong. (2004) (written testimony of Pamela 
Kogut, Massachusetts Assistant Attorney Gen.) [hereinafter Kogut 
Testimony],  available at 
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/media/pdf/062304pk.pdf (describing 
the actions taken by state attorneys general against FAMCO). 
69. Id. at 3 (stating that in Massachusetts, 35% of loan fees exceeded 
20% and 73% exceeded 10%).  See also 0HPRUDQGXPLQ6XSSRUWRIWKH6WDWH·V
Motion for a Temporary Injunction at 4, State v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., 
No. C9-­98-­11416 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 20, 1998) (supporting a temporary 
injunction, stating that the average loan fee in Ramsey County was almost 
22%). 
70. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 4 (majority of FAMCO loans 
were teaser rate ARMs);; Memorandum in Support of the State·s Motion for a 
Temporary Injunction, supra note 69, at 5 (stating that all of the Ramsey 
County borrowers had ARM loans with teaser rates of more than 3% on 
average). 
71. 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V 0RWLRQ IRU D 7HPSRUDU\
Injunction, supra note 69, at 5. 
72. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 4-­5. 
73. Id.  See also 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V0RWLRQ IRU D
Temporary Injunction, supra note 69, at 5-­10. 
74. 0HPRUDQGXP LQ 6XSSRUW RI WKH 6WDWH·V 0RWLRQ IRU D 7HPSRUDU\
Injunction, supra note 69, at 3. 
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for bankruptcy in 2000 in the wake of a joint New York Times 
and ABC-­TV story exposing its lending practices and the state 
lawsuits.75 
The FAMCO litigation was followed by two other multi-­
state actions, initiated by state consumer protection regulators, 
alleging UDAP violations by the largest subprime lenders at 
the time.  In 2002, the states reached a settlement with 
+RXVHKROG ,QF ´+RXVHKROGµ WKHQ WKH ODUJHVW VXESULPH
mortgage lender in the United States.76  The settlement 
included $525 million in restitution to homeowners and 
varying payments to the states.77  Perhaps more importantly, 
the settlement provided for extensive injunctive relief that 
could serve as a roadmap for the problems that lay ahead in 
the surging subprime mortgage market.78  The injunction 
OLPLWHG+RXVHKROG·VORDQIHHVUHTXLUHGWKDWORDQVFUHDWHD´QHW
tangible benefLWµ IRUERUURZHUVDQG LPSRVHGRWKHU UHJXODWLRQV
RQ+RXVHKROG·VPRUWJDJHRULJLQDWLRQSUDFWLFHV79 
In 2004, a similar group of states began investigating 
$PHULTXHVW0RUWJDJH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´$PHULTXHVWµ D FRPSDQ\
WKDWKDGEHFRPHWKHQDWLRQ·VODUJHVWVXESULPHPortgage lender 
and would become synonymous with unfair and imprudent 
subprime mortgage lending.80  The states eventually settled the 
case in 2006 for $325 million in restitution to consumers.81  
$JDLQ WKH VWDWHV· VHWWOHPHQW LPSRVHG DQ H[WHQVLYH LQMXQFWLRQ
oQ WKH FRPSDQ\·V RSHUDWLRQV DQG ORDQ YROXPH DW $PHULTXHVW
promptly fell.82 
 
75. Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Mortgaged Lives: Profiting 
From Fine Print With Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1;; 
Diana B. Henriques, Troubled Lender Seeks Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2000, at A1. 
76. See, e.g.6WDWHY+RXVHKROG,QW·O,QF1R&-­02-­12133 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. Dec. 16, 2002) (example of settlement agreement filed in all 50 states). 
77. Id. at 7-­11. 
78. Id. at 11-­22. 
79. Id. at 19. 
80. See, e.g., Kristin Downey, Mortgage Lender Settles Lawsuit, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­
dyn/content/article/2006/01/23/AR2006012301523.html. 
81. Id.  See also State v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. C0-­06-­2618, at 
*9-­13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2006) (example of settlement agreement filed 
in all 50 states) (on file with Pace Law Review). 
82. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., at *13-­37 (No. C0-­06-­2618). 
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These state consumer protection actions were coincident 
with the explosion and the development of the subprime 
mortgage industry.  At the time the states initiated their 
actions against FAMCO in 1998, subprime mortgage lending 
had increased dramatically, both in terms of the volume of 
loans and the percentage of new market originations.83  
Subprime mortgage volume stabilized at about $200 billion 
from 1998 through 2002.84 
The Ameriquest investigation and settlement occurred at 
precisely the moment the subprime mortgage market had 
begun its final surge that would ultimately overwhelm global 
financial markets.  Subprime mortgage lending jumped, 
starting in 2003, and then exploded in the period between 2004 
and 2006.85  The volume of subprime mortgage loans peaked at 
about $650 billion in 2006, an astounding rise from the volume 
level of about $200 billion in 2002.86  The conduct alleged to 
violate state laws in the Ameriquest case should sound familiar 
to anyone who has tracked the mortgage meltdown³falsified 
stated income loans, inflated appraisals, inadequately 
understood teaser rates on adjustable mortgages, and other 
conduct typical of this latter period of explosive growth in the 
subprime market.87  In other words, as the subprime market 
exploded and the deceptive and imprudent lending practices 
evolved between 1998 and 2006, the state UDAP actions were 
an excellent bellwether and predictor of the problems with this 
lending. 
 
83. ELLEN SCHLOMEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST & KATHLEEN KEEST, 
LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET & THEIR COST TO 
HOMEOWNERS 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-­lending/research-­
analysis/foreclosure-­paper-­report-­2-­17.pdf. 
84. Id. 
85. FED. RESERVE BD. OF SAN FRANCISCO, THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
MARKET: NATIONAL AND TWELFTH DISTRICT DEVELOPMENTS 8 (2007), available 
at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/annual/2007/2007annualrepo
rt.pdf. 
86. Id. 
87. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 30, at 3-­4.  See also State v. 
Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. C0-­06-­2618 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 21, 2006);; 
3UHVV 5HOHDVH 6WDWH RI:DVKLQJWRQ $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFHWashington 
Homeowners to Receive Millions in Ameriquest Settlement, (Jan. 23, 2006), 
available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?&id=16354. 
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B. Failure of the Financial Institution Regulatory System to 
Comprehend the Threat of Subprime Mortgage Lending 
 
The actions of safety and soundness regulators during this 
period showed a different pattern.  There is no shortage of 
blame to be laid on financial institution regulators for their 
failure to detect and remedy the sales and lending practices 
that led to the explosion of home foreclosures and the eventual 
implosion in residential mortgage lending.  State financial 
institution regulators, with fewer resources and substantially 
less regulatory power than federal regulators, were the 
primary regulators of non-­bank mortgage originators who were 
not subsidiaries of federally chartered institutions.88  Although 
these regulators joined with the state attorneys general in the 
multi-­state actions against major subprime lenders, they were 
unable to control the lending practices of these entities 
sufficiently to prevent the problems that occurred in the 
origination of residential mortgages.89 
Some of the most spectacular failures in the subprime 
mortgage market were federally regulated institutions.  The 
OTS, in particular, has been sharply criticized for its lax 
regulation of mortgage lending.90  ,QWKHQDWLRQ·VODUJHVW
mortgage lender, Countrywide Financial Corp. 
´&RXQWU\ZLGHµVZLWFKHGLWVFKDUWHUIURPWKH2&&WRWKH276
amid circumstances suggesting the worst sort of shopping for a 
weak regulator.91  Before its collapse, IndyMac was supervised 
by the OTS and originated extraordinary volumes of problem 
loans with little obstruction from the OTS.92  Likewise, OCC 
regulated financial institutions engaged in loan origination or 
invested in loans originated by mortgage brokers that led to 
massive losses, such as First National Bank of Nevada and its 
 
88. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 15. 
89. See Press Release, 6WDWH RI :DVKLQJWRQ $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO·V 2IILFH, 
supra note 87. 
90. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking 
Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008;; 
Editorial, Our View on the Credit Crisis: A System That Invited Bankers to 
Make Bad Loans, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2009. 
91. Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 90. 
92. Id. 
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predecessor banks.93 
As to substantive mortgage regulations, the federal 
regulators have substantial formal authority and the authority 
WRLVVXH´JXLGDQFHµWRWKHLULQVWLWXWLRQVEXWXQWLOWKHYHU\HQG
of the surge of subprime lending, these regulators did little to 
limit bank investment in, or origination of, problem loans.94  In 
1999, and again in 2006, the federal banking agencies issued 
JXLGDQFH RQ VXESULPH DQG WKHQ ´QRQWUDGLWLRQDOµ PRUWJDJH
products, but they brushed aside consumer advocate warnings 
about these products and refused to adopt substantial limits on 
such lending, either by formal or informal action.95 
In fact, a primary contribution of both the OCC and the 
OTS to substantive regulation of mortgage terms was the 
issuance of sweeping regulations preempting state laws that 
limited unfair mortgage loan terms for homeowners.96  For 
example, after Georgia passed its own anti-­predatory lending 
law with restrictions that applied even to secondary market 
assignees of mortgage laws, both the OTS and the OCC acted 
swiftly to preempt the Georgia law.97 
The OCC also actively worked to suppress consumer 
protection investigation of, and enforcement actions against, 
their regulated entities by state attorneys general, 
promulgating rules claiming for itself the exclusive authority to 
investigate and enforce violations of state consumer protection 
laws, thus purporting to effectively bar state enforcement 
agencies from enforcing their own state laws against a national 
bank even when those laws were not preempted.98  The United 
State Supreme Court recently found that this rule was so 
´EL]DUUHµDQGFRQWUDU\ WR WKH WH[WDQGKLVWRU\ RI WKH1DWLRQDO
Bank Act that it overturned the regulation, even while giving 
 
93. David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Two Bank Failures Hint At 
Oversight Woes, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Oct. 5, 2008. 
94. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 178-­81. 
95. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Risk, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006);; Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending (Mar. 
1, 1999), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/1999/FIL9920a.html.  See 
also IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 181-­82. 
96. COP REPORT, supra note 32, at 52. 
97. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 178. 
98. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009). 
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deference under the Chevron Doctrine.99  The OCC also 
regularly engaged in filing amicus briefs and intervening in 
cases on behalf of its regulated entities and against state 
UDAP enforcement or consumers seeking redress from a 
national bank.100  John Hawke, the former Comptroller of the 
&XUUHQF\SXEOLFO\GHIHQGHGWKH2&&·VSUHHPSWLRQRIVWDWHODZ 
and state regulators to persuade financial institutions to switch 
from a state charter to a national bank charter, stating that he 
ZDV´QRWWKHOHDVWELWDVKDPHGWRSURPRWHµ preemption as ´one 
RIWKHDGYDQWDJHVRIDQDWLRQDOFKDUWHUµ101 
While obstructing state UDAP enforcement with broad 
assertions of preemptive authority, the OCC and the OTS 
failed to initiate UDAP enforcement activity in the area of 
mortgage lending.  The OCC pursued almost no major UDAP 
actions involving mortgage lending during the period of 
abusive subprime mortgage lending.102  The OCC has almost no 
record of taking public consumer enforcement actions against 
large banks.103 
The FRB also took little or no action to control subprime 
mortgage lending.  It alone has the authority, under HOEPA, 
to impose nationwide substantive restrictions on all high-­cost 
residential mortgage loans.104  Again, only after the collapse of 
subprime mortgage lending in 2007 did the FRB update 
HOEPA rules, and even then, it delayed the effective date of 
the rule changes until October 2009, more than a year after the 
promulgation of the final amendments.105  The remarks of the 
FRB Directors during the subprime mortgage lending explosion 
make clear that it believed innovation in the mortgage lending 
 
99. &XRPRY&OHDULQJKRXVH$VV·Q6&W 
100. Quester & Keest, supra note 44, at 199. 
101. Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator 
Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers ² 'HSHQGHQWRQ/HQGHUV·)HHV2&&
Takes Their Side Against Local, State Laws ² Defending Uniform Rules, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1. 
102. Quester & Keest, supra note 46, at 195-­96. 
103. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed 
the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking 
System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232 
(2004). 
104. See supra notes 49-­51. 
105. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified 
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226);; 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,595. 
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market would be impeded by any serious attempt to impose 
substantive restrictions on high-­cost mortgage lending and that 
expanded subprime lending was a social good.106 
Federal regulators with a singular mission of supervising 
the financial institutions they chartered did little to 
comprehend or remedy the mortgage lending problems of the 
last decade and impeded the work of state legislatures and 
consumer protection enforcers in this area.  The most 
prominent actions against subprime mortgage lenders were 
taken by state attorneys general with general UDAP authority 
over these lenders, but also with UDAP responsibility for a 
range of other industries and marketplace conduct.  The 
following section suggests the reason for this outcome and the 
lessons that can be learned. 
 
III. Creating Safer Financial Institutions by Incorporating 
Consumer Protection Norms 
 
The oft-­UHSHDWHGSKUDVH´QRRQHFRXOGKDYHSUHGLFWHGWKLV
FULVLVµ LVSDWHQWO\LQFRUUHFW ,IUHJXODWRUVZHUHIRFXVHGRQWKH
reality of the subprime mortgage lending practices that began 
to emerge in the late 1990s, then nothing about the collapse of 
that boom would have been surprising.  The weakness of 
subprime mortgage loans, and the devastation visited upon 
subprime borrowers and their communities, was predictable 
and preventable.  It is not a coincidence that state entities with 
a central UDAP focus were the only regulators or organizations 
that made substantial efforts to identify and address 
rampantly imprudent mortgage lending practices during the 
time of explosive growth in this type of lending.  This result 
occurred even though the state attorneys general have far 
fewer resources devoted to the area of mortgage lending 
practices than federal depository institution regulators and 
possess far less authority to stop abusive practices by 
administrative order or regulation. 
 
106. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 181.  See generally Binyamin 
Appelbaum, As Subprime /HQGLQJ &ULVLV 8QIROGHG :DWFKGRJ )HG 'LGQ·W
Bother Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­
dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/AR2009092602706.html?sub=AR. 
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Therein lies two important lessons for the restructuring of 
financial institution regulation.  First, the information gained 
from enforcing UDAP laws differs from the information gained 
by enforcing other types of consumer protection laws, and this 
type of knowledge acquired from UDAP enforcement has been 
undervalued by regulators.  Second, it is critical to align 
incentives for UDAP enforcement and create an open and 
flexible structure for these enforcement actions against 
financial institutions. 
 
A. Building UDAP Norms in Financial Institution Regulation 
 
Regulator understanding of potential problems is 
determined in part by the type of information it receives, which 
informs the knowledge of the regulator about the industry and 
businesses it supervises.  Financial institution regulators 
would benefit by gleaning knowledge from effective UDAP 
enforcement. 
 
1. UDAP Enforcement Helps Regulators Gain 
Understanding 
 
Federal financial institution regulators have viewed 
FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ DV D ´FRPSOLDQFHµ SUREOHP ZKLFK RIWHQ
has been short-­hand for making sure that the regulated entity 
gave the consumer required disclosures.  These regulators 
periodically conduct examinations of their regulated 
institutions.  A search of the OCC website for its instructions to 
bank examiners on consumer protection issues yields mostly 
detailed manuals for ensuring that the institution complied 
with various federal disclosure laws.107 
Compliance examinations focus on reviewing data and 
transaction testing to determine performance and efficient 
market functioning, depending on the regulator.108  Federal 
 
107. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
COMPTROLLER·S HANDBOOK ² CONSUMER COMPLIANCE (1999), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/compliance.htm. 
108. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
COMPTROLLER·S HANDBOOK, at 1-­3 (1996), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/overview.pdf. 
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financial institution regulators generally rely on the regulated 
entity itself to report fraud to the regulator.109  Consumer 
protection compliance work of this sort is not of great 
importance to federal financial institution regulators, in any 
case, because safety and soundness concerns predominate.110 
Public actions for violations of UDAP laws, on the other 
hand, typically arise from observations and reflected 
experience of individuals who work closely with consumers who 
are in distress.  In the case of subprime lending, state 
attorneys general and other consumer protection regulators 
received complaints showing a pattern of mortgage loans whose 
terms revealed a disconnection between cost and risk, and in 
which homeowners repeatedly expressed misperception of the 
actual terms of the mortgage.  State attorneys general receive 
and evaluate large volumes of complaints by borrowers, and 
have expertise in analyzing such data for patterns of 
conduct.111  The more aggressive agencies also have close ties to 
credit counselors, legal aid organizations, and other public 
interest organizations, which reflect the experience of an even 
larger number of borrowers.112  In other words, consumer 
protection agencies gather and focus on data that is based on 
the experience and perceptions of the credit users. 
Furthermore, UDAP regulators often have a bias in favor 
of believing consumers whose experience is not necessarily 
consistent with the written documents purposed by the seller 
that memorialize the transaction.  In the case of FAMCO, for 
example, the state actions did not allege any breach of contract 
or non-­compliance with required disclosures, but rather focused 
 
109. See, e.g., Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and 
Investor Protection Laws: Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th 
Cong. (2009) (written statement of Elizabeth Duke, Member, Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/frb_-­_duke.pdf. 
110. Marilyn Cane, Non-­Broker Brokers and Other Anomalies in the 
Regulation of Financial Services, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 126 (1988) 
QRWLQJLQWKHVHFXULWLHVIUDXGFRQWH[WWKDW´Whe examination of banks has its 
IRFXVRQEDQNVROYHQF\QRWWKHGHWHFWLRQRUSUHYHQWLRQRIVHFXULWLHVIUDXGµ
See also Peterson, supra note 40, at 73. 
111. See Brief for Center for Responsible Lending et al. as Amici Curiae 
6XSSRUWLQJ3HWLWLRQHU&XRPRY&OHDULQJKRXVH$VV·Q6&W
(No. 08-­453), 2009 WL 556380. 
112. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 28, at 1, 7-­8. 
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on the highly misleading oral sales presentation that led 
borrowers to enter loans that they fundamentally did not 
understand.113  FAMCO was an early adopter of funding 
subprime lending through mortgage-­backed securities.114  In 
funding FAMCO ten years ago, Lehman Brothers was aware of 
WKH FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ FRQFHUQV ZLWK )$0&2·V VXESULPH
PRUWJDJH OHQGLQJ  $GLVWULFW FRXUW ODWHU IRXQG WKDW ´/HKPDQ
knew that First Alliance was engaged in fraudulent practices 
designed to induce consumers to obtain loans from First 
AOOLDQFHµ115 
Knowledge gained from UDAP enforcement has a direct 
bearing on financial institution safety and soundness.  In the 
case of subprime lending and the mortgage meltdown, loan 
performance data in the late 1990s and early 2000s would not 
necessarily have suggested a substantial reason for concern, 
principally because housing appreciation was covering the sins 
apparent when looking at the problems of individual 
homeowners.  A loan performs well for safety and soundness 
purposes if housing appreciation (and loose underwriting) 
allows a borrower to refinance from one unsustainable loan to 
an even more unsustainable loan, or allows that borrower to 
sell his or her home prior to default.116  It is a difficult task to 
sort through the influences on loan performance data at the 
time the data is current.  UDAP enforcers, however, 
understood that these loans were a disaster for borrowers long 
before it became apparent that creditors and investors holding 
these loans would suffer.117 
 
2. Methods for Incorporating UDAP Norms in Regulation 
 
The key to effective regulation is to bridge the gap between 
these two different types of knowledge.  Regulators must 
measure the reality of what borrowers really understand about 
 
113. See Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 3-­4. 
114. Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting From Fine Print 
With Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A1. 
115. In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 298 B.R. 652, 668 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). 
116. SCHLOMEMER, LI, ERNST & KEEST, supra note 83, at 13-­14. 
117. See Madigan 2009 testimony, supra note 28, at 2-­6. 
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a loan and whether borrowers are acting in their long-­run self 
interest, against the performance of consumer financial 
products.  If there is a disconnect between what UDAP 
enforcement reveals and what review of financial performance 
indicates, then a financial institution regulator has strong 
reason to dig deeper into the operations of the regulated entity. 
The starting point for creating these conditions with 
financial institution regulators is to increase the prominence of 
UDAP enforcement in the regulatory system.  UDAP concerns 
are seen by financial institution regulators as either irrelevant 
to mortgage market regulation or as antithetical to creating 
efficient mortgage markets.  Consumer complaints are too often 
considered either isolated occurrences or technical problems 
(e.g., failure to provide the correct disclosure form).118  The 
OCC consumer complaint system has been described by one 
commentator as actually discouraging the filing of consumer 
complaints about national banks.119 
Regardless of what new regulatory structures emerge from 
the variety of options for reform, a UDAP perspective can be 
brought into the core of the regulatory system.  The system for 
accepting, evaluating, and resolving consumer complaints 
should be as open and user-­friendly as possible.  Consumer 
complaints should be seen as an opportunity to gain insight 
into the understanding of financial institution products by 
consumers.  Financial regulators should also seek out 
information from individuals and organizations who work 
closely with borrowers and other consumers of financial 
institution products.  Credit counselors and consumer advocacy 
organizations have important knowledge about how consumers 
are using and evaluating financial products. 
While these actions can be part of almost any restructured 
regulator, a precondition to effectively incorporating a UDAP 
perspective into the regulatory system is the creation of the 
proper incentives for the regulator.  The next subsection looks 
at that issue. 
 
 
118. See Quester & Keest, supra note 44, at 235-­36. 
119. Id. at 236. 
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B. Structural Changes to Create UDAP Enforcement 
Incentives 
 
An obvious starting point for any structural change is the 
elimination of charter competition so that financial institution 
regulators will not have disincentives to bring UDAP actions 
DJDLQVW UHJXODWHG HQWLWLHV IUHH WR VZLWFK WR PRUH ´IULHQGO\µ
regulators.  A second critical reform is to end preemption of 
state UDAP actions against regulated financial institutions 
and expand the FTC authority over banks. 
 
1. Align Incentives For UDAP Enforcement Within 
Depository Institution Regulation 
 
The current regulatory structure is riddled with conflicts of 
interest that make it almost inevitable that consumer 
protection concerns will be seen as antithetical to the core 
mission of the depository institution regulators.  The banking 
UHJXODWRUV DUH VWUXFWXUHG IRU ´FKDUWHU FRPSHWLWLRQµ120  Banks 
are allowed to decide whether to have a federal or state 
charter, as well as whether to have a bank or savings bank 
(thrift) charter.121  Because the funding of financial institution 
regulators is based primarily on charter fees paid by the 
regulated entities, the size and prestige of the regulatory 
institutions³indeed their survival in some cases³is linked to 
the number of regulated entities under their authority.122  The 
record of financial institution regulators overall has been to 
take the side of the regulated entities against UDAP 
 
120. COP REPORT, supra note 32, at 33. 
121. IMMERGLUCK, supra note 46, at 177-­78. 
122. Id.  A related problem is the privatization of regulatory functions.  
The obvious example of this is the privatization of Fannie Mae in the 1960s.  
The effect of making these entities private has been to put consumer 
protection concerns in conflict with investor interests.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV·T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS 
FOR REVISING THE HOUSING ENTERPRISES· LONG-­TERM STRUCTURES 32-­34 
(2009).  A more subtle form of this privatization is allowing entities that 
serve a key function in determining the form and amount of mortgage lending 
to operate without regulation at all, or with minimal supervision.  In some 
states, mortgage originators are very lightly regulated.  The rating agencies, 
key players in the breakdown of risk management in the securitization 
process, were essentially unregulated.  GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 30-­32. 
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enforcement by other public entities as well as actions by 
private consumer law attorneys.123 
Charter competition should simply be eliminated by 
changing the funding method of these regulators and perhaps 
creating a unified regulator for all depository financial 
institutions.  Recent reports by the U.S. government on the 
financial crisis have presented this issue as a possible reform to 
be adopted in the restructuring of the financial regulatory 
system.124  Effective UDAP enforcement requires taking on the 
perspective of the aggrieved consumer.  It is difficult to imagine 
a regulator taking such UDAP concerns seriously when the 
regulator is funded by the regulated. 
 
2. Promote Regulatory Competition For Consumer 
Protection 
 
The incentives in the current financial institution 
regulatory structure for UDAP enforcement, or inaction or 
opposition to UDAP enforcement, should be flipped and 
barriers to public enforcement of UDAP laws against banks 
should be eliminated.  State attorneys general should not be 
precluded from bringing UDAP enforcement actions against 
regulated financial institutions.  Such a system would make for 
a more efficient use of limited UDAP enforcement resources as 
to financial institutions and lower the cost of UDAP 
enforcement by entities other than depository institution 
regulators.  In the current system, a state attorney general 
considering a UDAP action against a bank faces the near 
certainty that the bank will invoke the threat of preemption 
over state law or exclusive federal agency enforcement 
authority, and the financial institution will likely find an ally 
to assist in defending the case in its federal depository 
institution regulator.  The prohibition on the FTC bringing 
UDAP actions against banks should also be rescinded.  
Together, these actions would create an open UDAP public 
enforcement system as to financial institutions, which would 
 
123. See Brief for Center for Responsible Lending et al., supra note 111, 
at 22-­38. 
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 59-­60;; COP REPORT, supra note 32, at 
33. 
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have several advantages. 
An open UDAP public enforcement model would serve 
much the same function as marketplace competition.  More 
UDAP enforcement would increase the incentives for financial 
institutions and their regulators to prevent UDAP actions.  
Regulators faced with competing UDAP enforcement agencies 
would have a much greater incentive to pay attention to 
consumer complaints of unfair or misleading conduct.  A 
different public entity bringing a UDAP action against a 
financial institution under the purview of the regulator is not a 
situation that any public agency wants to experience.125  
Focusing regulator attention on this type of knowledge by 
providing the fear of action by a different public entity would 
help bring the type of knowledge gained in UDAP enforcement 
into the core of the financial institution regulatory function. 
An open enforcement model increases the number of public 
agencies that can take action and thus increases the likelihood 
that some public agency will be interested and available in 
pursuing needed UDAP enforcement cases.  Public agency 
priorities for UDAP enforcement shift over time with the 
elected or appointed officials in charge of the agency.  During 
the explosive growth of subprime mortgage lending, the FTC 
had UDAP authority for actions against FAMCO, Household, 
and Ameriquest because they were not banks, as well as other 
non-­bank subprime lenders.126  While the FTC later joined with 
the states in taking action against FAMCO in 1999,127 the FTC 
brought few UDAP actions against subprime lenders 
thereafter.  State attorneys general stepped into the void.  
Conversely, when the FTC is more active in a certain area, 
state attorneys general would have less incentive or need to 
pursue UDAP cases in that area.  Giving more agencies UDAP 
authority over financial institutions would result in more 
potential for enforcement action. 
 
125. For a recent example of the problems this poses to public agencies, 
one need look no further than the recent humiliation of the Securities and 
([FKDQJH &RPPLVVLRQ·V IDLOXUH WR DFW LQ WKH0DGRII FDVH  See, e.g., David 
Stout, RHSRUW'HWDLOV+RZ0DGRII·V:HE(QVQDUHG6(&, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2, 2009. 
126. See supra notes 63 & 88. 
127. Kogut Testimony, supra note 68, at 5. 
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The OCC, consistent with the position of regulated 
financial institutions, objects to multiple public agencies with 
enforcement authority because of the possibility of inconsistent 
regulatory requirements.128  Open UDAP public enforcement 
would not threaten inconsistency in disclosure requirements, 
substantive mortgage term requirements or other rule-­based 
regulations.  The risk of inconsistency comes in differing views 
of the various public enforcement entities in enforcing the 
broad standards prohibiting unfair and deceptive conduct.  
This is exactly the type of variation that allowed state 
attorneys general to bring actions against abusive subprime 
mortgage lending while other public regulators saw 
´FRPSOLDQFHµ LQ WKHVH ORDQV  8'$3 FDVHV DUH QRW HDV\ WR
initiate or prosecute, and having various standards forces other 
regulators and the regulated entities alike to pay attention to 
the critical knowledge gained by concern with UDAP violations. 
Finally, open UDAP public enforcement against financial 
institutions would help address a more subtle form of conflict of 
interest that exists in the inconsistency between safety and 
soundness regulation and UDAP enforcement.  A financial 
institution subject to possible or extant lawsuits for violation of 
UDAP or other consumer protection laws can be financially 
weakened by such actions.  Especially in a substantial UDAP 
case, this places the depository institution regulator in the 
SRVLWLRQ RI QHFHVVDULO\ GHIHQGLQJ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ·V SUDFWLFHV DW
LVVXHLQRUGHUWRPD[LPL]HWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ·VVoundness, at least 
in the short run. 
One alternative for preventing this result is to separate 
safety and soundness regulation from UDAP enforcement, but 
that structure defeats the advantage of combining these 
different sources of knowledge in the same regulator.  An 
option for avoiding this result is an open UDAP public 
enforcement model.  If state attorney generals, state financial 
regulators, or the FTC could readily bring UDAP actions 
against depository institutions or their operating subsidiaries, 
consumer protection interests would be vindicated.  At the 
same time, it would ensure that the depository institution 
 
128. Brief of All Former Comptrollers of the Currency Since 1973 as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29-­35, Cuomo v. Clearing House 
$VV·Q6&W1R-­453), 2009 WL 906571. 
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regulators would have a more substantial incentive to discover 
and prevent UDAP violations, in part to protect the safety and 
soundness of the institution. 
 
IV.   Conclusion 
 
A myriad of issues arise in considering the restructuring of 
financial institution regulation.  Enforcement of UDAP laws 
during the subprime mortgage explosion provided state 
attorneys general a richer, earlier understanding of what was 
actually happening in the mortgage market.  Whether because 
of conflicts of interest or regulatory approach, federal 
depository institution regulators were not in a position to 
effectively utilize this knowledge in regulating residential 
mortgage lending.  Regulatory reform should ensure that 
UDAP enforcement as to financial institutions is effective and 
that the knowledge generated from UDAP actions informs the 
decision-­making of financial institution regulators.  Opening 
UDAP enforcement against financial institutions to public 
agencies with a history of, and disposition toward, UDAP 
enforcement would help to achieve this goal. 
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